Institutional Complementarities between Organizational Architecture and Corporate Governance by Masahiko Aoki
%1
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-005
Institutional Complementarities between Organizational 
Architecture and Corporate Governance
AOKI Masahiko
RIETI
The Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/RIETI Discussion Paper Series 03-E-005 
 
Institutional Complementarities between 
Organizational Architecture and Corporate Governance 
 
Masahiko Aoki 





This paper explores an analytical reason why diverse corporate governance structure can be 
generated and sustained.  The paper identifies three generic modes of organizational 
architecture in terms of information connectedness between the manager and the workers. Any 
of them cannot have absolute informational advantage in achieving an organizational objective 
independently of attribute of organizational product and technological task environment. Using 
the concept of strategic complementarity in game, it is then shown that a different type of 
governance structure may be associated with each mode of organizational architecture that can 
resolve respective moral hazard problem in the second best manner. Argument clarifies a 
limited applicability of the property rights approach for understanding a diversity of corporate 
governance. Topics such as codetermination, the stake-holder society view, and the Silicon 
Valley model are related to the analysis. 
 
Keywords: comparative corporate governance, organizational architecture, institutional 
complementarity, property rights approach, codetermination, stake-holder society view, Silicon 
V a l l e y   m o d e l .              
    
 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conference on Corpora e Governance and 
Firm Organization: Nexuses and Frontiers held at Bocconi University on December 5, 2002 and 
the conference on Comparative Corporate Governance: Changing P ofiles of National Diversity 
held by RIETI on January 8, 2003.     
t
rIntroduction 
We observe that different types of corporate governance structures tend to evolve 
across economies.  On the theoretical plane, legal and economic scholars, as well as 
practitioners, have been debating for decades whether corporate governance ought to 
be, and will be, structured in the sole interests of investors or for a broader range of 
objectives including public and other stakeholders’ interests. Some of them argue that 
the presence of different types of corporate governance structures remains from 
inefficient historical legacies, and they ought to converge eventually according to the 
identical standard of stockholder sovereignty. Others argue that convergence is not 
desirable or possible because of ethical, political, historical and other reasons. But a 
difference in organizational premises underlying both views has not necessarily been 
elucidated nor have its implications been subjected to economic analysis. Above all, 
corporate governance is literally about ways of governing the corporation that is an 
organization far more complicated than a mere partnership of investors and a simple 
principal-agent relationship between the investors and the manager. There are 
different types of organizational architectures of corporate firms across industries, 
economies, regions, as well as over time and developmental stage. Depending on which 
type, the appropriate governance structure associated with each of them may be viable.   
 
Using game-theoretic and information-theoretic tools, this paper inquires into a 
theoretical reason why a variety of corporate governance institutions can exist and be 
sustained. Specifically it starts with identifying three generic modes of organizational 
architecture in terms of information connectedness among basic constituent units. 
They are hierarchical decomposition, information sharing (assimilation) and 
information encapsulation, each of which may be deemed as having familiar analogues 
in the actual economy. Then it analyzes how a different type of governance structure 
can evolve as a complementary institution responding to incentive and information 
problems unique to each architectural type. We also consider possible game-theoretic 
linkages of these governance structures with distinctive institutions in other domains, 
such as financial markets, polity (political economy) and labor markets.  In other words we try to understand different corporate governance structures as an instance of 
multiple equilibria that link games in the organizational domain and other domains of 
the economy. This analysis thus provides one theoretical reason why some 
organizational architecture, and thus associated governance structure as well, can 
become a convention in one economy but not in others.   
 
 
A Comparative Institutional Analytic Approach 
Following a comparative institutional analytic methodology as developed in Aoki [2001], 
institutions may be conceptualized as shared beliefs among people in a relevant 
domain regarding ways how the game is repeatedly played. The reason why such 
beliefs can be generated, shared and sustained is that they reflect and summarily 
represent the essence of an equilibrium state of the game in that domain. Such 
equilibrium state may be consistent with statutory laws constituting the formal rules 
of the game, but not necessarily so.    Statutory law can affect the expectations and thus 
incentives of the agents who act strategically and thus an equilibrium outcome (an 
institution).  However, an institution generated endogenously through the strategic 
interplays of the agents may be different from the original intention of the government 
who writes and enacts statutory law. 
 
We may define a corporate governance structure as an instance of institution thus 
conceptualized. Specifically, we consider the domain composed of the manager, workers 
and investors (sole proprietor, shareholders, debt-holders, banks, venture capitalists 
and so on, depending on context). Then we regard a corporate governance structure as 
self-enforcing rules of the game regulating action choices of those players contingent on 
evolving states.  In particular, its crucial element may lie in managers’ beliefs 
regarding possible actions of other players in a critical contingency (a sub-game) such 
as corporate financial crisis. Such beliefs may, or may not, constrain manger’s moral 
hazard behavior in other contingencies and as a result the actual occurrence of the 
critical contingency may, or may not, be observed with frequency. As we will see below, such beliefs may be conditional on the ways that other institutions are structured in 




Three Generic Modes of Organizational Architecture as an Information System  
In order to explore a basic premise for the emergence of diverse corporate governance 
structures, we start with identifying three generic modes of organizational architecture 
in terms of information connectedness among organizational constituents. For the sake 
of simplicity, consider an organization, of which the objective is to produce or design a 
complex final product, say a computer, for the highest value (alternatively, at the 
lowest possible cost). Suppose that this product is a system that can be divided into two 
subsystems, say hardware and software, which may be called modules. Separate 
agents are engaged in the production or design of these modules.   
 
The organization must process two kinds of information to achieve its objective. One is 
“systemic information,” and the other “idiosyncratic information.” The latter is derived 
from the task environment idiosyncratic to the design/production task of respective 
modules. Hence it can be hidden within each unit. The former kind of information is 
derived from the systemic environment that affects the design/production tasks of both 
modules simultaneously. A connective rule among modules, i.e., the specification of the 
interfaces, can be determined based on the systemic information. We then may need a 
third agent, which is exclusively or non-exclusively engaged in processing and/or 
mediating the systemic information. We call this system-integrating agent the 
“helmsman,” borrowing from the classical article on the design of economic systems by 
Arrow and Hurwitz (1960). The following three generic types and one derivative type 
are conceivable as generic procedures to process the systemic information and 
formulate a connected rule out of it. 
 
Hierarchical Decomposition:  In this type the helmsman is exclusively specialized in processing the systemic information and determines the connective rule ex ante, i.e., 
prior to the design or operating task of each modular task agent. Even if something 
occurs in the systemic environment after activities in the respective module tasks begin, 
only the helmsman can decide changes in the connective rules. Thus the helmsman 
acts as a sole system designer. Each modular task agent is engaged in processing only 
idiosyncratic information required for its activity, given the visible systemic 
information transferred to it by the helmsman. This mode of information 
connectedness may capture the essential element of functional hierarchy, of which a 
classical example may be found in the design and production of IBM/system 360 
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Figure 1: Hierarchical Decomposition 
 
 
Information Sharing (Information Assimilation): Under the leadership of the 
helmsman, information regarding the changing systemic environment is processed by 
the modular task units as well and fed back to the helmsman.    Thus, connective rules 
continue to be fine-tuned even after the activities in the respective modular task begin. 
A typical example of this mode may be found in the Toyota design team in which 
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Figure 2: Information-Sharing 
 
 
Information-Encapsulation and the “Silicon Valley model”:  The third generic type is 
one in which the modular task units process both systemic and idiosyncratic 
information independently of each other and a connected rule is somehow determined 
ex post as a result of their decision-making based on their own information.  In this 
type information processing is encapsulated within each modular task agents and thus 
differentiated.  There is no role explicitly played by the helmsman except for the 
mediation of information exchange to make interfaces of both modules mutually 
compatible.  Helmsman
ES




Figure 3: Information Encapsulation 
 
 
A derivative mode of this type may be visualized as follows: Suppose that there are 
multiple independent agents, instead of only one, for each modular task that are 
engaged in encapsulated information processing. Visible decisions (interface and 
performance characteristics of modules) by modular task agents are collected and 
mediated by the helmsman. Thus multiple connective rules may emerge ad interim in a 
competitive way. The helmsman selects and combines two task outcomes, one from 
each module ex post that will form a product system in the best way. We may call this 
system the “Silicon Valley model” (Aoki 2001, Aoki and Takizawa, 2002) or the 
“modular cluster” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).   Helmsman
ES
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Figure 3: The Silicon Valley model as a derivative of information encapsulation 
 
 
The above three modes (and one derivative mode) actually exhaust all possibilities of 
organizational architecture in terms of information connectedness. Before we relate 
these three modes to respectively distinct governance structures, we briefly note that 
there is no absolute informational advantages among any of them independently of the 
nature of the product system (in terms of the degree of attribute complementarities 
among modules) and the nature of the technological environment (in terms of the 
relative uncertainty of the systemic environment vis-a-vis idiosyncratic environment).   
 
Resolving dependencies among all design specifications of a complex system at one 
time can be very costly. The cost of processing and transmitting information will be greatly saved by dividing a complex system into modules and localizing coordination 
within modules. This is the most primitive motive for modularizing a product system 
through hierarchical decomposition. Still another benefit of hierarchical decomposition 
may come from specialization, since an agent working on each modular task can be 
specialized in idiosyncratic information processing, while the processing of systemic 
information processing is exclusively performed by the helmsman specialized in that 
skill.  However, the bounded-rational helmsman cannot foresee all the uncertainties, 
enumerating and resolving all possible dependencies among modules.  But, once the 
connective rules are set, it may become costly to modify it in response to emergent 
information. The development of IBM System/360 provided us with a good example 
here as well. Indeed, after design rules are centrally set, various problems arose in the 
course of designing respective modules and system testing (Baldwin and Clark). The 
more complex a system is, the more incomplete the ex ante design of connective rules 
among modules would be. Thus, hierarchical decomposition cannot escape from a 
trade-off between facilitating coordination by localization and sacrificing optimality in 
the whole system.   
 
As the complexity of the product system increases, it may become desirable that a 
connective rule is fine-tuned as emergent systemic information becomes available. It 
will be informationally more efficient to do so by letting modular task agents 
participate in systemic information processing and pooling information fed back by 
them, when the information processing skills of the modular task agents become 
enhanced and their tasks and product attributes become closely inter-related. However, 
when their tasks become more independently performed in terms of product attributes 
as well as technological interdependencies, the encapsulation of systemic information 
processing by modular task agents become informationally more efficient and the role 
of the helmsman may be reduced to the mediation of decision taken by them based on 
individual information.  See Aoki (2001, ch. 4) and Aoki and Takizawaa (2002) for an 
analysis of comparative informational efficiency of the three modes. The Silicon Valley 
model adds another informational benefit at the costs of duplication of resource inputs by multiple agents in performing the same task. That is, it can create option value by 
running multiple experiments in each module design and forming a complex system 
evolutionarily by the ex post selection of the best combination of module designs from 
among many experiments. We will discuss this merit later in more detail.             
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Figure 4. The Relative Informational Efficiency of the Three Modes 
 
 
Thus the information advantage of each mode can be relative, dependent on the 
technological environment and product attribute of the product system. There is no 
absolutely superior mode of organizational architecture. This property has significant 
implications for the comparative assessment of corporate governance structures, as 
each mode may entail a unique structure of governance.   
 
 
The Hartian Property Rights Approach as a Special Case 
Let us take up the celebrated contributions of the theory of the firm by Oliver Hart and 
his associates. Here we re-interpret their major insights in the context of our 
framework. First, consider the simplest domain of organization in which the mode of 
hierarchical decomposition is established. Let us identify the helmsman with the 
manager and the modular task agents with the workers. Assume that they make 
respective firm-specific human investments, but that the accumulated skill of the former is “essential” in the Hartian sense, while the workers’ are not. That is, the 
manager’s task performance is indispensable to the productive use of physical assets 
used by her as well as by the workers so that the workers cannot enhance their 
productivity without her intervention, even if they own the entire set of physical assets. 
On the other hand, the manager can (at least partially) realize her value even without 
the skilled workers if she owns the physical assets. In this case, the second-best 
solution is for the manager to acquire the ownership of the entire set of physical assets. 
Only in this way is the manager motivated to accumulate the essential human assets of 
her own. The essentiality of manager’s skill may be thought of as composed of her 
ability to dictate the use of physical assets to the workers in a productive manner 
within the context of hierarchical organizational architecture, when contracts are 
incomplete. Thus, the manager’s ownership of physical assets is institutionally 
complemen ary to the hierarchical production coordination by the manager.  In other 
words, proprietor’s firms are expected to win out in competition vis-à-vis other forms of 
ownership arrangements, where the hierarchical mode is a convention of 
organizational architecture in the economy. However, as we have seen, there can be 
other modes of organizational architecture (production coordination) so that the 
linkage o  thi  type i  to be regarded as a specific case, albeit an important one, even if 




When the manager cum owner becomes cash-constrained, she must then raise funds 
from outside investors through debt contracts (when cash constraint is moderate) or 
stockholders through equity contracts (when it is severe). This situation can be 
analyzed as a three-person repeated game between the investor, the manager and the 
worker(s). In this game, the investors control the supply of funds; the manager 
makes/shirks investment in firm-specific human capital and is engaged in hierarchical 
coordination; and the worker makes/shirks investment in firm-specific human capital 
and is engaged in production using physical assets. One kind of such model can be 
obtained simply by augmenting the Tirole’s Econometrica  model (2001) with the 
explicit addition of the workers. One can derive the following implication from such model: “value-enhancing takeover by a new stockholder may n t necessarily be 
efficiency-enhancing, when the ‘breach of trust’ by a new manager is retaliated by the 




Institutional Complementarities between Co-determination and Corporatism 
In the hierarchical decomposition mode, it is assumed that the workers may be 
subjected to the efficiency wage discipline. That is, the workers invest in firm-specific 
human capital and use it in the second-best manner in the anticipation of employer’s 
sharing of surplus with them as far as the manager has kept the promise to do so. 
Imagine, however, that a wage rate is fixed by a corporatist agreement between the 
trade union and the employers association on the national level and each management 
is obliged to comply with it.   
 
Suppose that in order to elicit the workers' cooperation under this institutional 
environment, the employer (suppose for a while she is a manager cum owner like the 
Hartian proprietor) allows the workers to participate in the “residual rights of control” 
(Grossman and Hart 1986) – the rights to decide on the use of human and physical 
assets in contractually unspecified events --, provided that the workers have always 
cooperated (made efforts in organizational skill development) in past periods (stage 
games). Otherwise she keeps the residual rights of control to herself and does not make 
any payment beyond what is determined in the corporatist agreement. In a symmetric 
way, the workers make reciprocating efforts, provided that the employer has always 
partially relinquished residual rights of control to the workers in the past periods, and 
otherwise shirk. Let us assume that the workers can reduce their effort costs by 
participating in the residual rights of control, possibly because of improvements in 
working conditions, participation in work-place design, more autonomous control of 
their work, etc. On the other hand, there may be some reduction in the employer’s 
utility in the event of partial relinquishment of residual rights of control, for she may 
not continue to implement the work plan that she likes the best. Still, it can become one possible equilibrium over periods that the reciprocating cooperative strategies are 
sustained by both parties. The participation of the workers in the residual rights of 
control transforms the organizational architecture from a functional hierarchy to a 
participatory hierarchy. Thus co-determination is institutionary complementary to the 
emergence of the participatory hierarchy. (TCIA, ch.10.2) 
       
When the equity of the original owner of the firm is still too small relative to the 
required capital, financial capital needs to be raised from outside investors.    However, 
in this case the governance structure cannot be the same as the shareholder 
governance discussed in the previous section because the workers participate in the 
residual rights of control. Suppose that both the workers and investors (shareholders 
and creditors) are able to cast a veto vote vis-à-vis a management action that they 
prefer less than the status quo, or deny the reappointment of the manager for the next 
round of the stage game, depriving her of an opportunity to obtain an employment 
continuation value. Thus, the workers and investors can exercise separate control 
rights over the management. Let us call this governance arrangement codetermination. 
Then, any unilateral new action that would hurt the workers can be blocked by a 
workers veto and/or by the manager’s career concerns.   
 
On the other hand, assume that although the investors supply full financing, they have 
little useful information for facilitating the smooth operation of the participatory 
hierarchy within the firm, and thus are passive in formulating a business plan. The 
possibility of restructuring after initial financing can be perceived only by the manager 
who has invested in firm-specific human assets. However, the investors can threaten to 
withdraw financing and the workers can be non-cooperative if they choose to do so. In 
this setting, it can be proved that the corporatist wage-setting is institutionally 
complementary to the linkage of participatory hierarchy and codetermination (TCIA. 
Ch10.2) There may be a stock value-enhancing management plan that can be chosen 
under shareholder governance but not under co-determination, if it is expected to have 
a welfare-reducing impact on the workers and incite a retaliatory uncooperative choice of efforts by them. The two governance mechanisms are thus not necessarily 
Pareto-rankable. Also, it is interesting to note that under the codetermination external 
financing is made more in the form of long-term debt contracts, as the interests of debt 
holder and that of the worker are more congruent than under the functional hierarchy 
(TCIA, ch 11.2).   
 
 
Information- Sharing and Relational Contingent Governance:   
As already mentioned, there has been a persistent stream of thought in corporate 
governance literature that the corporation actually is, or at least ought to be, run in the 
interests of various stakeholders including the workers, but not in the sole interests of 
the shareholders. Even Adolph Berle, who was engaged in a harsh debate against this 
view in the early 1930s converted to it later in his career. Recently Jean Tirole, a sharp 
analytical economist, made the following comment in his Presidential Address to the 
Econometric Society: “The stake-holder society view has not been provided with a good 
theoretical perspective, as it is difficult to theoretically design multi-task incentives for 
the manager or an effective arrangement for the division of control rights among 
stakeholders”(2001).    Even if that is so, it is possible to design a corporate governance 
arrangement in which control rights shift (not “are divided”) between stakeholders 
contingent on the outcome of the stage game, more specifically, between the insiders 
(the managers and workers) on one hand and a designated agent of the investors on the 
other. Thus, I call this governance arrangement the relational-contingent governance. I 
first derive this mechanism theoretically as a second best solution to a free-riding 
problem inherent to the organizational architecture of information-sharing and then 
discuss dilemma in its implementation.   
 
Let us assume that the mode of information sharing has been established as an 
architectural mode in which the information processing activities of both manager 
(helmsman) and workers (modular task agents) are crucial inputs to each other to be 
productive.  We may interpret this situation as that both the manger’s skill and workers' skills become essential in the sense of Hart. That is, both the manager and the 
workers cannot generate surplus value without mutual cooperation, even if either of 
them owns the entire (or relevant) set of physical assets. In this situation, an 
ownership arrangement cannot resolve the governance problem. Catching this 
essential aspect of the information-sharing mode in the simplest form, let us simply 
assume that they are symmetrical in their contribution to the organizational output 
but each of them cannot precisely observe the level of effort of the other. This type of 
production organization is referred to as the “team” in contract theory literature 
(Alchian-Demsetz-Holmstrom). In it, free riding on other members’ efforts becomes an 
inherent moral-hazard problem that cannot be resolved by the sharing of outcome 
among the team members (the manager and workers) alone. There must be an external 
discipline.  
 
Suppose that the team needs some outside financing for productive activity. It is 
provided by numerous investors who expect a certain level of financial returns. They 
cannot however observe even the aggregate output value of the team ex post, but can 
observe only the court-verifiable event of its termination. They entrust the enforcement 
of financial contracts to a particular relational monitor (R-monitor) who can observe 
the aggregate output value of the team at the end of each stage game and then exercise 
control rights contingent on it according to a contract agreed with the team members at 
the beginning of the repeated games. The R-monitor requires a certain expected level of 
income over periods for this service payable from the current output of the team.   
 
In this setting, it can be proved that the following nexus of contingent contracts is the 
second-best corporate governance arrangement for the free-riding problem (TCIA, 
ch.11.3). It divides the entire range of the team’s possible output value at the end of 
each stage game into the following four regions in the order of the highest to the lowest, 
and specifies control rights to be exercised either by the insiders or the R-monitor on 
each of them. In the highest region, insider-control region, both investors and 
R-monitor get a fixed amount of returns and the residual output value is equally shared exclusively among the insiders. In the next highest R-monitor-control region, 
control rights to output shift to the R-monitor. The R-monitor pays the same rate of 
return to the investors as in the insider-control region, pays the agreed fixed amount of 
income to the insiders, and acquires the non-negative residual. The team continues to 
the next stage game. In the next lower bailing-out region, the payment schedules are 
the same as the previous region except that the output value level is so low that the 
residual borne by the R-monitor becomes negative. However, the team is to be 
sustained to the next stage game. This corresponds to the case in which the R-monitor 
bails out the team comprised of the wealth constrained insiders. In the lowest 
termination region, the R-monitor terminates the team after making contractual 
payments of the minimum income to the insiders and a fixed rate of return to the 
investors lower than the expected investor’ rate. Deficits after the termination are to be 
borne by the R-monitor. The deficit born by her in this region is smaller than that in 
the bailing-out region, as the investors receive less there. 
 
The nexus of contracts just described defines a basic mechanism of governance 
regarding both the disposition of the team’s output and its continuation at the end of 
each period. Since control rights shift between the insiders and the R-monitor in a 
punctuated manner contingent on the value of the team’s output, we may call this 
arrangement the relational-contingent governance. In the insider-control region, the 
insiders become residual claimants, as in the case of an insider-controlled firm. 
However, if such a status were to extend over the entire range of output value, the 
moral hazard inherent to the team would become unavoidable. Further, if the value of 
output is very low, it may not be sufficient to guarantee the minimum required income 
of the wealth-constrained insiders. For these two reasons, if the value of output falls 
below a certain level, the residual claimant status shifts to the R-monitor.   
 
If the value of output falls even further to below the termination point, the team is 
terminated and its members have to accept inferior outside options. This 
efficiency-wage-like discipline can provide incentives for the insiders not to shirk. The outside option value may be taken as a parameter by the insiders of an individual team, 
but its lowering can be regarded as a (general equilibrium) outcome of the 
organizational architectural convention of information-sharing prevailing in the 
economy. Namely, if all firms are structured as teams relying on the context-oriented 
skills of their members and individuals’ skills are geared toward a particular team 
(firm), they cannot freely move between the firms without suffering from a loss in their 
employment continuation value. Thus, the effectiveness of the relational-contingent 
governance is enhanced when the information-sharing mode is established as a 
convention in the organizational field. Conversely, as we have discussed above, the 
information-sharing mode can be run in the second-best manner when it is governed by 
the relational contingent governance. Thus, the organizational convention of 
information-sharing mode and the contingent relational governance are mutually 
reinforcing and institutionally complementary.  
 
Since the partial cost of termination may be born by the investors in terms of a lower 
rate of returns, in practice there may be incentives for the R-monitor to terminate a 
financially troubled team, even when it should be bailed out. To counteract these 
incentives, there must be some intrinsic values -- rents -- available for the R-monitor 
for credibly committing to a bailing-out operation whenever it is appropriate to do so. 
We thus discern one important dilemma inherent in the mechanism of 
relational-contingent governance: On one hand, if rents are not sufficiently high, the 
R-monitor may be motivated to terminate firms that should be bailed out. That is, 
valuable organization-specific assets may be destroyed even when mildly poor 
performance occurs due to uncontrollable stochastic events but not to the actions of 
insiders. If such tendency prevails, we may refer to it as “short-termism” syndrome. On 
the other hand, if rents made possible by bailing-out are too high, the monitoring agent 
may be motivated to bail out a firm that should not be bailed out. If expectation 
prevails to the effect that the latter is the case, the mechanism of relational-contingent 
governance fails to provide proper incentives ex ante for the insiders of 
information-sharing firm to make sufficient efforts.  The tendency is known to economists as the “soft-budget constraint” syndrome (Kornai).   
 
Which syndrome prevails in a particular economy depends on the relative magnitude of 
rents against bailout costs facing the relational monitors. Explicit contracts of 
relational-contingent governance are hard to write in practice because of the 
complexity of the contractual environments. Further, the rents from bailing out may 
not be determinable in individual organization domains, but may be specified and 
generated only in a broader institutional context in which they are embedded. In 
actuality, one cannot assume therefore that costs and rents are arranged in such a way 
that the second-best solution can be implemented with precision in each organization 
domain. It is reasonable to expect that one or another of the syndromes may prevail.  
This is a dilemma inherent to the relational contingent governance. Yet, in 
environments where rents and costs remain fairly stable, albeit not balanced exactly in 
a second best way, expectations regarding the possible behavior of R-monitors, whoever 
they may be, may become predictable, and firms of the information-sharing 
architecture type may accordingly be disciplined while being able to accumulate and 
preserve organization-specific assets in a more or less steady fashion. However, when 
there is an environmental change that drastically transforms the parameter values 
defining the costs and rents of bailing-out, so that expectations regarding monitoring 
agent’s possible actions become uncertain, the provision of effective 
relational-contingent governance will become problematical. 
 
My discussion above remained at a highly abstract level. In particular, I have been 
silent about who the relational monitors can be and what their incentives are to bail 
out financially depressed firms. There are several institutional possibilities of 
contingent governance relationships: e.g., (i) between firms and their main bank; (ii) 
between subsidiary corporations and their holding/management company; (iii) between 
an entrepreneurial start-up firm and a venture capital company; (iv) between 
state-owned enterprises and the government; or (v) between banks and the government 
regulatory agency. These possibilities and their inherent syndromes are discussed in TCIA, pp. 300-5.   
 
 
The Silicon Valley Clustering as a New Mode of Corporate Governance Structure 
Now let us move on to a discussion of governance issues of the derivative mode of 
information-encapsulation – the Silicon Valley model. The model assumed that 
multiple agents are competitively engaged in each modular task, while the helmsman 
takes a mediating role in selecting ex post the optimal combination of completed tasks 
(modules). In a more concrete context, the former can be identified with entrepreneurs 
competing in the development of new modular products potentially constitutive of a 
new innovative product system. The function of the latter may be conceived of as being 
dispersed and fulfilled by various agents. They may include incumbent firms that have 
already established a leading position in a niche market and strives to consolidate the 
position by acquiring developmental results of start-up firms. They may also include  
experienced angels and venture capitalists that finance, and thus are engaged in the 
governance of, the start-up firms. The individual entrepreneurs are engaged in highly 
sophisticated information processing in competititon, encapsulating and hiding its 
contents from each other except for visible interface and performance characteristics.     
 
This informational characteristic of the Silicon Valley phenomenon ought to be 
conceptually distinguished from “de-integration” in terms of the ownership of physical 
assets.    Observing a trend toward “de-integration [that] has occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s,” Hart commented that “because of advances in information technology, agents 
who were previously engaged in routine tasks need to be motivated to make wise 
decisions on the basis of the increasing amount of information at their disposal.”(1955, 
p.53) This characterization may be thought of consistent with ours on the information 
encapsulation.  Hart continues to argue that his theory predicts that the importance 
of individual initiative entails the decentralized ownership of physical assets among 
independent entrepreneurs. However, in Silicon Valley and other places of 
entrepreneurial clustering, de-integration in this sense is not widely observable. In actuality, start-up entrepreneurs are often devoid of initial capital and ought to be 
financed by the venture capitalists, angels and others. This arrangement provides a 
unique governance structure extended over the clustering of competing 
entrepreneurial firms, of which characteristics cannot be understood if an individual 
entrepreneurial firm is observed in isolation.     
 
The information encapsulation in the Silicon Valley model allows that each module of a 
potentially innovative system can be developed independently of the design of other 
modules, as far as the interfaces and performance requirements among modules are 
standardized ex ante or ad interim and known to each entrepreneur. An innovative 
system, then, may be evolutionarily developed by combining the best-developed 
product of each module ex post. When system development is extremely complex, this 
process may have a superior innovative capacity in comparison to the case where 
system design is done in a hierarchical manner once for all, or design improvements 
may be done through intense information exchanges and sharing among a fixed set of 
modular task agents. This is so because the process can create option values (Baldwin 
and Clark) by allowing each module to experiment on diverse designs in the presence of 
high uncertainty. However, the option value cannot be obtained without costs. The 
costs are the duplication of development costs within each module. Further, if the cost 
of development by an entrepreneur has to be financed by outside investors so that 
possible returns are to be shared with them, entrepreneurial incentives may be 
compromised without a proper governance arrangement. How can these costs of 
development be controlled?   
 
Let us consider a game played by the venture capitalist (VC) and two groups of 
entrepreneurs, each competing for the development of a modular product. These two 
modular products may be combined through standardized interfaces. The VC finances 
the initial development funds to multiple entrepreneurs in each module design and it 
then monitors their design development without necessarily observing their effort 
levels directly. It mediates a modicum of information sharing among entrepreneurs if necessary for the ad interim modification of interface. Eventually the VC selects only 
one entrepreneur for each module for the completion of its project and realizes its 
values by bringing it to public offering or arranging an acquisition by an existing 
company. The realized values can be shared between the VC and the selected 
entrepreneurs according to ex ante share contracts, but other entrepreneurs do not get 
anything. It is essentially a tournament game played among entrepreneurs refereed by 
the VC and we may call this arrangement VC governance by tournament. The VC is 
linked to other financial markets for raising funds, but I do not deal with this aspect 
here.  
 
We now take a balance. The arrangement can create option value with the cost of 
duplicated development efforts and financing (Baldwin and Clark). The tournament 
provides additional incentives for the entrepreneurs in contrast to the case of a 
stand-alone development effort, because marginal benefits of additional effort are 
composed of marginal expected benefits obtained in case of winning plus positive 
marginal gains obtained from enhanced probability of winning (TCIA, ch 14). However, 
as the number of entrepreneurs competing in each modular design increases, this 
incentive effects are diluted so that there is an optimal number of entrepreneurs 
competing in each module development, depending on the degree of uncertainty 
involved in development and the expected value of final products (Aoki and Takizawa 
2002). Particularly interesting is the following proposition: If total value of an 
innovative system is expected to be high, and if the VC’s selection of winning 
entrepreneurs is believed to be reasonably precise by entrepreneurs, then it is possible 
that, even for the same share allocation between entrepreneurs and financiers, the VC 
governance by tournament can elicit higher development efforts from entrepreneurs 
than under arm’s-length financing, and that its effect, together with the creation of 
option value, can compensate social costs of duplicated development efforts.   
 
 
Concluding Remark on the Role of Law Using simple generic models I have shown that there may exist diverse corporate 
governance arrangements associated with different modes of organizational 
architecture. Also, I have argued that those arrangements may be supported by 
respective complementary institutional arrangements in other domains (see TCIA for a 
more comprehensive treatment on this subject). This may indicate that a corporate 
governance arrangement may have a relatively robust property that may be hard to be 
changed in isolation, unless complementary changes occur in other domains. Also, a 
mode of organizational architecture tends to evolve as a convention, although conscious 
design elements are also involved. Thus a particular corporate governance 
arrangement and a corresponding organizational architecture may co-evolve. Do all 
these indicate that an attempt to improve on a corporate governance arrangement 
through the design of statutory law is bound to be futile? Obviously, this is not the case.   
  
Statutory laws affect the pay-off functions of the game structure. In other words, they 
may provide information to the players about what could be the pay-off consequences of 
their actions, if laws are enforced, although whether they are actually enforced or not is 
a matter determined through the strategic interplays between the enforcer and other 
players. Thus statutory laws affect the outcome of the game through the expectations 
of the players as well as their incentives. Thus statutory laws are not institutions per 
se in my conceptualization, but it can induce the evolution of an institution. In 
particular, codified rules of corporate governance, that is, the legal rights and duties 
afforded to various agents (particularly shareholders and employees) and the 
associated legal procedures, define the exogenous rules of the game in the corporate 
organization domain, and as such they may affect the beliefs and incentives of the 
agents and thereby corporate performance (La Porta et al 1998). However, legal rules 
that are inconsistent with equilibria in complementary domains, particularly with a 
prevailing convention of organizational architecture, may not yield the outcome 
intended by the legislature.  For example, the Japanese Commercial Code provides 
minority shareholders with one of the strongest rights at stockholders’ meetings.  
However, its governance arrangement is normally not considered to be stockholder-controlled (see TCIA,  .ch. 14). A reason can be that the organizational 
architecture conventionalized in the Japanese economy is not of hierarchical 
decomposition type complementary to it.   
 
On the other hand, sustainable legal rules for corporate governance may be understood 
as the codification of an equilibrium arrangement that evolved through a long history 
of complementary institutions (e.g., co-determination in Germany. See TCIA ch.6). A 
careful and systematic study is called for on how the initial institutional conditions, 
such as the legacies of old institutions and the prevailing informal rules (norms, social 
ethics, etc.), kinds and levels of the existing stock of human competence can affect 
subsequent legal evolution, and conversely, how formal rule-setting in the polity 
interacts with the evolution of endogenous rules of the games (i.e., institutions) in 
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